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THE LABOR COURT IDEA
R. W. Fleming*
the War Labor Board first began to exert pressure on
companies and unions to adopt grievance arbitration clauses
during World War II,1 there was a considerable hesitance on both
sides. Both groups worried that while third party decision making
might momentarily improve productive efficiency, it would do so at
the price of a long-run loss in institutional integrity and autonomy,
and peace at any price held little fascination for either side. Nevertheless, grievance arbitration was accepted and gradually became the
normal mechanism for resolving contractual disputes in the United
States.
Other industrialized nations have been less attracted to arbitration and instead often have established a system of labor courts. 2 The
relative merits of the two systems thus naturally come into question.
This question is worthy of consideration not because of Judge Hays'
superficial and intemperate attack upon arbitration, 3 but because
collective bargaining is dynamic, rather than static, and because both
arbitrators and arbitration are expendable if there is a better solution.
Professor Aaron, of the UCLA Law School, and a group of European
scholars are presently engaged in a broad study which will doubtless
furnish us with better documented answers to this question than now
exist, but in the meantime some of us who have a modest exposure to
labor problems in certain European countries may engage in preliminary analyses.

W

HEN

I.

THE SWEDISH SYSTEM

Sweden is frequently cited as a desirable industrial relations
model for the United States to follow. It is much smaller and more
homogeneous than the United States, but it is highly industrialized,
has maintained a remarkable record of full employment, and has a
standard of living much like that found in this country.
The Swedes first established a labor court in 1929, though its jurisdiction was increased by subsequent legislation.4 It is exclusively
• Professor of Law and Chancellor, University of Wisconsin, Madison; PresidentDesignate, University of Michigan • .B.A. 1938, Beloit College; LL.B. 1941, University
of Wisconsin.-Ed.
I. Freidin &: Ulman, Arbitration and the National War Labor Board, 58 HARv. L.
REV. 309 (1945).
2. See generally McPHERSON &: MEYERS, THE FRENCH LABOR COURTS: JUDGMENT BY
PEERS (1966).
3. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING VIEW (1966).
4. SCHMIDT, THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 39 (1962).
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competent to handle cases falling within its jurisdiction, and other
courts must thus refuse to take such cases. It is essentially a trial court,
but its decisions are final and not subject to appeal. The Swedish
Constitution does, however, permit the Supreme Court to grant permission for a new trial in cases decided by the Labor Court. The
conditions which must be fulfilled in order to obtain a new trial are
stringent: gross miscarriage of justice, new ·evidence of a decisive
character, and so forth.
The Court consists of a chairman and seven members, all of
whom are appointed by the King. The normal term of office is three
years, and members are usually reappointed. None but the chairman
is full time. Three members, including the chairman and the vicechairman, are what we would call "public" members. Both the chairman and the vice-chairman must be learned in the law and have judicial experience. The third "public" member must have special
knowledge and experience in the field. The other members of the
Labor Court are laymen-two of them representing management and
three representing labor. The three union men do not sit simultaneously: one of them is from the salaried employees' organization,
and he replaces one of the other two union members when the Court
is considering a case involving salaried employees. Thus, there are
never more than four laymen sitting at the same time, and the Court
' can act when only one layman from each side is present. Nominations
for the lay members of the Court come from the employers' association and the union federation. This is less complicated than it would
be in the United States, because for all practical purposes there is a
single employers' association, a single large federation for production
workers, and only one organization for salaried employees. Despite
their representative character, these Court members are expected to
be objective, and they do not view themselves as committed in advance to the position of one side or the other. The logic behind their
appointments is to secure the benefit of their specialized knowledge
and to create a tie between the Court and the major employer and
employee organizations. Europeans seem to have been notably more
successful than we have in establishing the principle that the labor
and management members of such courts are expected to be objective, and such objectivity will not bring recrimination down around
their heads. 5
Since there are seven members of the Court, the four lay members
can theoretically outvote the neutrals. At an early time this did in
fact happen: employer and employee members once joined in an
5. McPHERSON &: MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 52.
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interpretation of the rules concerning the right of association and
produced an opinion very unfavorable to the syndicalist unions.
However, complaint was made to the Ombudsman, that guardian of
rights against the civil authorities about whom we have heard so
much in this country lately, 6 and the Court then unanimously swung
into line.
In the early years, dissenting opinions showed up in approximately forty per cent of the cases, but at the present time they are
said to run more nearly ten to seventeen per cent. Labor dissents
are more common than those from the management members, but it
must be noted that almost ninety percent of the cases are brought to
the court by workers. This is not strange since in Sweden, as in
the United States, the employer is normally free to act, subject to a
protest on the part of the union or the employee.
The rules of procedure before the Labor Court are relatively
simple.7 The chairman convenes a preliminary meeting of the parties
before the actual hearing. He does not, however, attempt to encourage a settlement; rather, the principal purpose of the meeting
is to weed out the issues and to be sure that the parties know what
they are going to present. In advance of the hearing, each party submits a statement of his case: the aggrieved party files a complaint
which is answered by the other side within a period of two or three
weeks. The complainant may respond to the answer, and the other
side may file an additional response, so that four papers-two from
each side-may be in the hands of the Court members before the
hearing is held. No party is permitted to add new materials at the
hearing. The Court could, on its own motion, adjourn in order to
permit the examination of alleged new evidence, but this power
is more academic than real, since the problem rarely occurs. No
transcript is made in a routine Labor Court case, but law clerks
(young men attached to the Court) take notes of the testimony of
witnesses and then prepare a summary. After the hearing, the members of the Court convene in executive session to discuss the decision. If they are able to agree, the chairman is asked to have a draft
of the decision prepared. The law clerks frequently help in the
drafting of decisions; once such a draft is prepared it is circulated
to the members for approval. Frequently the decision is approved
without a further meeting of the Court, but, in more complex cases,
6. See generally GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN (1966); GELLHORN, O:MBUDS·
(1966).
7. For this and other information, the author is indebted to Johan Von Holten,
Assistant Director of the Swedish Employers' Confederation, and Stig Gustafsson, Legal
Adviser to the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions, for time they spent with him
in Stockholm in the summer of 1965.
MEN AND OTHERS
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several drafts reflecting different points of view may be prepared
and the members then meet to thrash out a decision. The format of
the decisions is not unlike our own arbitration opinions and awards.
Costs are assessed at the end of a case and consist principally of
Ia-wyers' fees and expenses for the witnesses. Under Swedish law,
the losing side may be asked to assume the lawyers' fees incurred by
the winning side, but the employer and employee federations, which
frequently represent the parties, usually decline to ask for costs unless
they believe that the other side has proceeded with a case which is
without merit for the purpose of harassment. It is hard to get estimates of the cost of a typical Labor Court case, but informants
suggested that it might run somewhere between 800 and 1200 krona,
which at the present exchange rate would be roughly $150 to $235.
It apparently takes between two and three months from the time an
average complaint is filed to the date of the hearing, and then another
four to six weeks before the decision is released. 8 Most of the hearings are held in Stockholm, even though the case may arise in some
other part of the country.
The exact jurisdiction of the Swedish Labor Court is not easy to
describe, but in general it is oriented toward the collectiv~ agreements, as is arbitration in this country. The Swedes have, however,
resolved without difficulty one problem that has always given us
trouble: the right of the individual to process his grievance despite
the disinterest or unwillingness of his union. 9 In Sweden, the individual can carry his case forward if he wishes. 10
The case load of the Labor Court is not very heavy. During the
first nventy-four years it handled 2,858 cases, an average of about
120 cases per year.11 Once certain key principles were enunciated,
the strong employer and employee federations settled many disputes
without referring to the court. Many of the current cases are said
to involve small employers which have contracts with the unions,
but which are not members of the employers' federation.
So much for the broad surface manifestations of the Swedish
Labor Court. The picture is inadequate, but the overall outline
is clear. It would not be unreasonable to conclude at this point that
the Swedish Labor Court and the American voluntary grievance
8. For this information, the author is indebted to Richard Peterson who spent the
summer of 1965 in Stockholm while working on his Wisconsin Ph.D. thesis.
9. Summers, Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective AgreementA Comparison of Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421, 453 (1963).
10. The United States Supreme Court has recently decided that an individual employee does not have an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration.
Vaca v. Sipes, 35 U.SL. WEEK 4213 (Feb. 27, 1967).
11. SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 42.
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arbitration tribunal serve much the same function, and that which
forum one prefers may be a matter of taste. Both appear to be
..,oriented toward collective bargaining, the arbitration board is
frequently tripartite for the same reason as is the Court (but with a
different tradition as to objectivity from its members), both tribunals
tend to be informal (though the Court appears to be better organized
than the ad hoc arbitration hearing), the Court firmly espouses the
adjudicatory approach which many feel should characterize the
arbitration tribunal, and the Court seems to be more successful in
achieving expeditious hearings at a lower cost. This last point may
be due as much to the kinds of cases which come before the Court
(about which more will be said later) as to the fact that the state picks
up the bill for the judges.
Even without probing below the surface, however, it is clear that
an attempt to transplant the Swedish Labor Court system into the
United States would raise significant problems. The case load of the
Court is low by comparison with what it would have to be in this
country, and it would be impossible to make Washington the counterpart of Stockholm for the purpose of holding all the hearings.
Some kind of regional system would have to be established in America, and in our federal framework this might be troublesome. Even
more fundamental problems result from the fact that the industrial
relations framework in the two countries, about which nothing has
been said so far, is vastly different. Over a period of time each
country evolves its o·wn institutions and they are, like human beings,
partly a product of their environment. Thus, in order to have any
understanding of the true role of the Labor Court in Sweden, one
must first take an overall look at the pattern of industrial relations
in that country.
A principal characteristic of the Swedish system of industrial relations is that it is based much more upon agreement than upon legislation.12 Such a system presupposes powerful federations, and this is
exactly what one finds. One big bargaining association dominates
each side. The Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF) represents
the employers, and the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO)
represents the employees. The union confederation got started first,
in 1898, with the immediate objective of organizing and administering a joint strike insurance fund. The employers responded, in 1902,
by establishing a confederation of their own, and it too was a sort
of mutual insurance society. A few tumultous years followed in
12.

JOHNSTON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SWEDEN:

AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

115-75 (1962).

A

STUDY OF THE LABOUR

MARKET
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which the employers were particularly suspicious of the tie between
the union confederation and the Labor Party, particularly since the
communists had not yet split off to form their own party. Neverth~
less, in 1906 the employer and union confederations did reach an
agreement at the national level which has been the basis of their
system of employer-employee relations ever since. This so-called
"December Compromise" consisted of three basic points:
I. the mutual recognition 0£ the right to organize;
2. the recognition by the union confederation of the right of the
employer to direct and distribute the work of his enterprise, and
to engage and dismiss workers regardless of whether they belonged to a particular union, or to no union at all; and
3. the tacit understanding of the two confederations that both would
insist on the right of employers and workers to fix wages and
other terms of employment by means of free bargaining.

In 1936, the first point in the above compromise was incorporated
in legislation. This extended that part of the agreement beyond the
sphere of the two confederations, which did not, in and of themselves,
cover the entire economy. Point two has been made a part of the
constitution of the employer:;' confederation, so that every collective
contract to which an SAF affiliate is a party must contain, a clause
safeguarding the management rights enumerated in the December
Compromise. Over the years there have been some modifications in
this clause, as will be shown later, but it remains substantially intact
and is a point of significance in any comparison between the Swedish
and American dispute tribunals because it plays a large role in determining the kinds of cases which come before the Swedish Labor
Court.
Since the two powerful confederations play so important a part in
Swedish industrial relations, it is necessary to say a brief word about
them. The employers' confederation consists of approximately fortyfour national trade associations which employ over one-third of the
total work force of Sweden. According to the constitution of the SAF,
an individual employer becomes a part of the confederation by joining one of the national trade associations. Moreover, all applications
for membership in an association have to be approved by the SAF.
Unlike the practice in the United States, where collective agreements
are typically signed by the employer and the union, collective agreements in Sweden are, as a rule, signed by the associations on behalf
of their members, and the SAF has a considerable amount to say
about such agreements. The agreement must be approved by the
SAF before being signed by either an association or an employer.
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The SAF may even instruct an individual employer on the solution
of a particular problem which is deemed to have importance beyond
the employer's individual situation, though this power is rarely
used. Discipline within the employers' confederation is maintained
in a variety of ways. There is a mutual insurance fund to which a
member can be denied access if the loss results from an unauthorized
lockout or a strike provoked by unjustified action on his part. Furthermore, an association or individual employer is liable for a heavy
fine or expulsion if it violates the SAF constitution or a decision
rendered by the SAF in conformity with that constitution. On the
affirmative side, the SAF has the power to order a lockout on behalf
of a part or all of its membership.
The union confederation includes approximately forty-two national unions. Its central powers are less than those of the SAF,
but it does have the right to be represented in every union negotiation and to make proposals if it wishes. The LO may also deny
strike benefits out of its mutual insurance fund to any union which
rejects a proposal put forth by the LO for the purpose of ending a
dispute. In principle, the decision to accept a contract or to strike
rests with the particular union, but before striking the union must,
on pain of being denied access to the joint fund, apply to the LO for
a special authorization to strike if the strike would involve more than
three per cent of the union's membership.
It is apparent from the above that in Sweden both employer and
union confederations represent a centralized power in collective
bargaining which has no counterpart in the United States. This
special structure obviously has an impact upon the handling of
grievances. Moreover, unlike the rule in the United States, the courts
in Sweden have held that a collective contract is binding not only
upon the organizations, but also upon their individual members.
Thus, a breach of the contract exposes the offender to civil law suits
for damages. Early in the twentieth century, strikes were more
frequent and the legal recourse of employers (since the injunction
was not available) was to bring the offenders before the general law
courts, where the proceeding might last for several years before the
Supreme Court finally decided the case. By 1929, contract violations
were sufficiently serious to cause the Parliament to establish the
Labor Court. This legislation, in addition, provided that the parties
to a collective agreement are bound to refrain from certain kinds of
coercive conduct during the life of the contract. Thus, from the very
outset, the Labor Court in Sweden was far more than a tribunal
designed to resolve differences over the interpretation of collective
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bargaining contracts. Moreover, although private arbitration does
exist in Sweden, and is in fact contemplated by the legislation, it
cannot be used to bypass the Labor Court in contract breach or invalidation cases.
This sketchy outline of collective bargaining in Sweden, and the
role which the powerful confederations play, is obviously inadequate
to do more than suggest some of the difficulties in trying to compare
American grievance arbitration and the Swedish Labor Court, but
it may help to emphasize points of difference. A point which remains
to be made, and which requires explanation, is that the jurisdiction
of the Labor Court is in some senses immensely broader than that of
the arbitration tribunal. On the other hand, the Labor Court does
not handle many kinds of disputes which constitute the bulk of the
business before American arbitrators.
In the United States, organizational problems (which for all
practical purposes means organizational problems on the union side,
since we do not have many organizational problems with management) involve unfair labor practices which are within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). On occasion, a
state labor relations board may be involved in similar cases. Sweden
has no counterpart to the NLRB, and organizational cases go to
the Labor Court. Additionally, in the United States, certain kinds
of wage problems-minimum rates, maximum hours, and overtime
pay-would be covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act and would
be enforceable by the Secretary of Labor in the federal courts.
Similar cases in Sweden would come before the Labor Court.
Finally, as mentioned above, in Sweden the collective agreement is
binding not only upon the corporate parties, but also upon the
individual members; whereas, in the United States, the status of the
individual vis-a-vis the collective contract is much more ambiguous. 13
Thus, Swedish Labor Court has an effective weapon against coercive
tactics, such as strikes and boycotts. In the United States, some of
these tactics would properly fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB,
others could come before state or federal courts, and a few might
come before arbitrators. Damage suits against individual union
members would be almost wholly ineffective in American courts,
and damage suits against unions have, ·with some exceptions, been
tactical maneuvers rather than real attempts at getting monetary
awards.
Perhaps more important, however, than the items handled by
the Labor Court and not by American arbitrators, are the items
13. See FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRAnoN PROCESS 107-33 (1965).
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which constitute the bulk of the business before arbitrators but
which do not come before the Labor Court. In theory, both have
jurisdiction over interpretations of the collective agreement. In fact,
several of the most contentious issues on the American scene do not
come before the Swedish Labor Court at all. Indeed, as a rough approximation, it seems likely that about sixty per cent of the issues
which come before arbitrators in the United States do not come to
the Labor Court in Sweden. Thus, in a 1957 sample of American
Arbitration Association cases, roughly twenty-five per cent of the
total were discipline and discharge cases, approximately seventeen
per cent were seniority items, and another twenty per cent involved
such things as job evaluation, incentives, and union security.14 As a
general rule, none of these items comes to the Labor Court. Seniority
is simply not a concept which has been embodied in Swedish collective bargaining contracts. It is apparently practiced to a certain extent, but it is not provided for by contract. Doubtless, one reason for
this is that the Swedes have been extraordinarily successful in maintaining full employment, so that a worker has little difficulty in finding a new job. Another and more fundamental reason, which applies
equally to the other issues mentioned above, is that another forum
is available for handling such disputes.
As was said earlier, a principal characteristic of the Swedish industrial relations system is that, starting with the December Compromise
of 1906, it has relied more upon agreement than upon legislation. In
1938, the December Compromise was amplified into what was known
as the "Basic Agreement"; it has been amended since then in 1947,
1958, and 1964. The agreement calls for the creation of a Labor
Market Council on which the SAF and the LO have equal representation. Normally there are three regular representatives and six
alternates from each side. On occasion, the Labor Market Council
sits as an arbitration tribunal and, when it does, an impartial chairman (usually the chairman of the Labor Court acting in a private
capacity) is appointed jointly by the SAF and the LO. One need
only look at the charter of the Labor Market Council, which is a
wholly private organization perched at the pinnacle of the Swedish
collective bargaining structure, to understand its importance and to
put the role of the Labor Court in better perspective. The Basic
Agreement is too long to outline in detail, but in brief it gives the
bipartite Labor Market Council jurisdiction over the following:
contract negotiations; the right of either party to terminate an em-

J.

14. Procedural and Substantive Aspects of Labor-Mana~eme1it Arbi(rqtion, 1~ ARB.
(n.s.) 131 (1957).
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ployment contract of indefinite duration; the right to lay off labor
due to a shortage of work; coercive acts by either party; conflicts
threatening essential public services.
The 1906 agreement established the principle that the employer
is entitled to engage and dismiss workers at his mm discretion. Fairly
early in its existence, the Labor Court interpreted this principle to
mean that a dismissed worker could not bring the matter before
the Labor Court or any other court. Thus discharge cases, which are
so common before American arbitrators, do not come to the Labor
Court. This is a rather shocking idea to those who are accustomed
to American industrial jurisprudence, because one of the prime
benefits of the collective agreement in America is generally thought
to be the protection that it gives the individual against arbitrary or
unjust discharge. In practice, however, the situation in Sweden is
not quite as it may sound. In the first place, the fact that there has
been full employment in Sweden means that it has been relatively
easy for the dismissed worker to find another job. Second, the bargaining relationship between the two giant federations is such that
their members are unlikely to behave capriciously. Third, the Labor
Market Council is empowered, when a discharge case is referred to
it, to award damages to the worker if it finds that there were no
material grounds for dismissing him.15
A somewhat similar situation prevails with respect to reductions
in force. If the employer implements a proposed reduction, the labor
side can bring this to the Labor Market Council. Once the dispute
is before the Council, the agreement provides:
In its appraisal of the action the Council shall pay due consideration both to the extent to which production is dependent on the
skill and suitability of the labor employed and to the worker's legitimate interest of security of employment. Accordingly, consideration
shall be given to the necessity for the employer to be served, so far
as is possible, by skilled labor suited for the job. Further, when the
choice is between workers of equal skill or suitability, the length
of service of the individual worker and also any especially heavy
family obligations he must meet shall be borne in mind.
The Council shall seek to arrive at a concerted opinion in judging disputes referred to it, and to devise means for settling the differences between the contesting parties. Any decision upheld by the
majority of the Council shall be communicated to the trade federations concerned, and it shall rest with the latter, in consultation with
the SAF and the LO, respectively, to resort to any such measure as
may be prompted by the decision.16
15. Basic Agreement Between the Swedish Employers' Confederation and the Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions, chapter III, article 4.
16. Id. chapter m, lll"ticle 7.
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Union security cases, which are not frequently heard by American
arbitrators, are totally absent in the Swedish set-up, because the 1906
agreement provided that an employer could hire a worker regardless
of whether he belonged to a particular union or to no union at all.
Since this early agreement still obtains, if an employer who is bound
by a closed shop contract wishes to join the SAF, he is required to remove this provision from the contract. The LO, true to the December Compromise, will see that the union does so.
Incentives are important in the Swedish industrial complex, and
some sixty-five per cent of the workers are on some sort of piecework.
But once again, disputes in this area are handled by a special tribunal
set up by the SAF and the LO. A separate agency, called the "Time
and Motion Study Board" is assigned the following tasks:
a. following and furthering collaboration in questions relating to
time and motion studies, as well as time and motion study
councils, and promoting a sound and suitable practice of time
and motion studies;
b. handling and deciding, as an arbitration board, disputes concerning, first, the validity or the meaning of the provisions contained
in this agreement; secondly, the question whether certain procedures conflict with these provisions; and, thirdly, the consequences entailed by procedures that are found to be conflicting.17

The Time and Motion Study Board is composed of three members
from each of the organizations, plus an equal number of deputies.
The SAF and the LO agree upon an impartial chairman for a period
of three years.
In addition to the Labor Market Council and the Time and Motion Study Board, there are other ways in which the SAF and the LO
cooperate in establishing joint panels for one purpose or another,
but they are not immediately relevant to the subject at hand.18

II.

SOME CONCLUSIONS .ABOUT THE SWEDISH LABOR COURT

Having now looked briefly at the Swedish Labor Court, both as to
organization and operation, and at the overall bargaining structure
and industrial relations climate in Sweden, we can, with a much
better perspective, return to the question of how labor courts compare with the American labor arbitration tribunal.
Initially, if the labor court is viewed in isolation, it is possible to
conclude that it and the arbitration tribunal serve much the same
function, namely, to resolve differences over the meaning and in17. Agreement Concerning Time and Motion Studies Concluded by Swedish Employers' Confederation and Confederation of Swedish Trade Unions, article 5.
18. JoHNsrON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 216.
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terpretation of collective bargaining contracts. There are even common philosophical tenets: the tribunal should be tripartite; the
proceedings should be informal; appeals may be taken or decisions
reviewed on extremely limited grounds; and the mediation function
is generally subordinated to the adjudicatory function.
As we have seen, however, there are below the surface very important differences between the Swedish Labor Court and the American arbitration tribunal. For one thing, the Labor Court has jurisdiction over matters that in this country would typically come before
the NLRB or the courts. For another, issues which in America would
constitute the major part of the business before arbitrators do not
come to the Labor Court at all. Significantly, this is because the
Swedes have created other agencies, such as the Labor Market Council and the Time and Motion Study Board, to handle such problems;
and these agencies are, in case of disagreement, essentially private
arbitration boards set up under the aegis of the parties to the contract. Stated differently, what the Swedes have done is to take the
issues which would normally come to arbitration in the United
States and send them to bipartite review boards which can, in the
event of disagreement, turn themselves into impartial arbitration
boards. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to jump to the conclusion that any attempt to compare the labor court, in a country
like Sweden, with grievance arbitration in America is misleading
and that the real comparison should be between grievance arbitration and the Labor Market Council or the Time and Motion Study
Board. The fact is that, while the Swedes have a formula for turning
their bipartite boards into tripartite boards for the purpose of resolving deadlocked disputes, they rarely have to resort to this procedure.
Thus, there is more arbitration in theory than in practice, and if
one attempted to compare the experience in Sweden with the experience in America, he would find almost no cases in Sweden.
One could conclude from all this that any attempt to compare
grievance arbitration in America with similar institutions in Sweden
is an exercise in futilty. The Labor Court is not really the same kind
of an animal, and the Swedish arbitration boards are more theoretical
than real, simply because the parties find it unnecessary to use them
to any substantial degree. But there is a difference between saying
that comparisons are difficult and saying that there are no lessons
to be learned. Whether the Swedes have anything to learn from us,
I leave to them. Clearly, in my view, we have some things to learn
from them.
First, their bargaining confederations, while operating in a much
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smaller geographical area and a much less complex industrial economy than exist in the United States, exercise a degree of industrial
statesmanship and discipline which is hard to find in this country.
It may be that some of the strife now found on the labor-management
scene in the United States could be alleviated if we were to develop
larger bargaining units with greater powers of discipline. This is
one of the factors which makes it possible for the Swedes to handle
so many of their conflicts over contract interpretations on a bipartite
basis.
Second, the collective bargaining climate in Sweden tolerates,
and indeed expects, objective participation on the part of all the
partisan members on the court or in the arbitration process. On
the other hand, any objectivity from partisan members of an American arbitration tribunal is generally covert. This is not to suggest
that there is anything subversive about the American approach; it is
simply to say that the traditions in the two countries are different. Perhaps in the last analysis it makes no difference, since the underlying
philosophy of having partisan members may be simply to gain the
advantage of their expertise and greater familiarity with the job.
Since that can be obtained whether or not partisan members ultimately dissent from an award, it may not be of great significance
that partisan members in America do not pretend to be objective.
On the other hand, wear and tear on neutral members of arbitration tribunals would often be saved if their colleagues were in a
position to take a completely objective view of the issues without
respect to the feelings of their constituents.
Third, there are procedural standards set by the Swedish Labor
Court which are clearly superior to those found in most of our ad hoc
arbitration situations. The Labor Court does have a preliminary
hearing, not for the purpose of mediating the issue but in order to
clarify the issue and to sharpen the presentation. No complaint is
more familiar among American ad hoc arbitrators than that the
parties so often badly prepare and present their cases. Additionally,
costs are kept low and the time-lag is not serious under the Swedish
procedure.
Fourth, the delicate problem of whether to permit the individual
to bring an action which the union either opposes or is unwilling
to process has been resolved in favor of the individual, and no serious
damage to the collective relationship has resulted. 19 (It should be
noted that the circuits are now in conflict on whether it is an unfair
labor practice for a union unfairly to refuse to prosecute a grievance;
19. Summers, supra note 9.
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if the NLRB is upheld in its view that this constitutes an unfair labor
practice, we may have a remedy in this country.20)
If these general observations about grievance arbitration in America and the Labor Court in Sweden are valid, a legitimate question
remains as to whether Sweden is sufficiently illustrative of the general
labor court pattern in W estem Europe to justify generalizations. A
recently published book on the French labor courts throws some light
on that question because it includes some material on such other
European labor courts as the ones in Austria, Germany, Belgium,
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland. 21 There are major variations among the European labor courts in both structure and procedure. Several, for instance, rely heavily on mediation techniques,
although, as has already been pointed out, the Swedish Court does not.
However, there are also many common denominators, including a
wish to accelerate decisions, reduce expenses, and rely, at least in
part, on lay members who come from the contending parties. Thus,
in at least four broad areas it does seem possible to generalize about
labor courts in Europe.
First, the jurisdiction of the court normally includes areas beyond
the pale of the grievance arbitrator in America. Almost nowhere else
is there a counterpart of the NLRB or of the wage machinery under
the Fair Labor Standards Act; their functions are absorbed, insofar
as they exist, by the labor court. In addition, some matters are
brought to the labor court in Europe which would come before civil
courts in America.
Second, many subjects which constitute a large segment of the
grievance arbitrator's load do not come to the labor court. Probably
the most important example is the firm rule of law in most European
countries that the court is without power to order the reinstatement
of an individual who has been unfairly discharged. The most that
such an individual can expect is damages. The individual who is
dismissed may in all probability be entitled to severance pay, but
what Americans would consider to be the most appropriate remedy,
reinstatement, is not available.
Third, labor courts invariably have lay members from labor and
management, and the principle that these members are expected to
be unbiased is now well established. France illustrates this aspect in
the most spectacular fashion by having a labor court which is bipartite, though there is a provision to add a neutral member from the
20. Cf. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 362 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 12, Rubber
Workers v. NLRB, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
21. McPHERSON & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 2-7.
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local judiciary in case of deadlock. 22 At an early date, a struggle took
place in France over the freedom of the lay members to vote objectively, rather than voting on the instructions of their respective
constituents, and it was ultimately made illegal for the parties to instruct court members.
Fourth, under the labor court system, workers may normally bring
cases whether or not they are members of the union and whether or
not they are covered by a collective agreement. This is so partly because some benefits which one would derive from the collective agreements in America are provided by statute in Europe, and partly
because, as McPherson and Meyers explain:
[T]he agreements are typically negotiated not by single employers
but by employers' associations. They apply to the establishment of
all member firms in the particular industry for a region or, more
frequently, the nation. The negotiating associations normally have
a comprehensive membership that includes many establishments
where only a minority of the workers are organized, except in the
Scandinavian countries, where few such establishments can be found.
Consequently, a number of firms are subject to the agreement that
would not, in the American context, negotiate with a union.
Second, most European countries provide by law for the compulsory extension of agreements under certain circumstances to
establishments that were not originally parties to it. The typical
provision is that the government, at the request of the parties to an
agreement that was applicable originally to a large majority of the
employees in an industry, will extend to the entire industry, within
the area covered, those parts of the agreement that relate directly
to the terms of employment.2a

III.

CONCLUSION

From the preceding analysis, it is fairly evident that European
labor courts do not offer a ready alternative to the American grievance arbitration tribunal. They do not serve the same function, nor
do they exist in the same industrial relations climate. They can, of
course, provide some valuable lessons. Most of all, however, the
comparative exercise should serve to remind all of those who have
a stake in the grievance arbitration system that its long-run viability
depends upon its capacity to change. Institutions, like individuals,
are forever called upon to meet new problems under new and different conditions.
More than anything else, grievance arbitration needs a system of
self-examination and self-renewal, and this can only be done by a
joint enterprise in which arbitrators, labor, management, and the
22. Id. at 48.
23. Id. at 5.
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appointing agencies participate. I once suggested that this might be
done by borrowing from the courts the idea of the "judicial conference."24 The suggestion was not well understood by non-lawyers
because the word "conference" sounded like it meant some kind of
periodic meeting similar to that of the annual meetings of the National Academy of Arbitrators. The word "committee" would have
been better understood. The purpose of the judicial conference is
simply to give advice upon the needs of the circuits and upon other
matters concerning the administration of justice in the courts of
the United States. The analogous "arbitration conference" would
give advice on the needs of grievance arbitration tribunals and upon
other matters concerning the administration of the voluntary arbitration system in the United States. The work of the judicial conference is done through committees which are composed of judges,
practicing lawyers, and scholars. The work of the arbitration conference would likewise be done through committees composed of
arbitrators, experienced representatives of labor and management,
and scholars.
Two very practical problems stand in the way of establishing an
arbitration conference-assuming, of course, that the idea is a good
one in the first place. The first is that there is no counterpart of the
statutory framework which brings the judicial conference into being;
the second is that the United States Treasury is not available to
pay the expenses which would be incurred. As to the first, since
grievance arbitration is private, the framework for the arbitration
conference should logically remain private. This implies that labor
and management, more specifically companies and unions, must be
sufficiently interested in the idea to give it financial support. If they
are, a ready administrative mechanism should not be hard to find.
The American Arbitration Association, with its network of regional
offices, is already in existence. Alternative possibilities would be to
establish a program under the auspices of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, or the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The
Academy is not presently equipped to carry out such a function,
and perhaps should not undertake it. The Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service could do the job; however, if it did, the task
would lose something of its private character. This is not necessarily
fatal, and it may be that the Service should both act as the catalytic
agent for such a program and obtain the support for it from public
funds.
24. FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 13, at 199.
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In the last analysis, the question is not whether a mechanism can
be found for carrying out the proposed purpose of an arbitration
conference, but whether there is a felt need for it. The argument
that there is rests on tvva propositions: (1) the rule that institutions
remain viable and socially constructive only insofar as they build
in a capacity for change; and (2) the observable fact that there are
many areas of the arbitration process which need exploration and
fresh thinking. Enumeration of a few of these areas may be helpful
in making the point.
Grievance systems which lead ultimately to arbitration are often
deficient in at least two respects: :first because the screening mechanism is inadequate, and second because the issues remain ill-defined,
or are badly presented. The implications of poor screening and illdefined, badly presented grievances are great, both for the relationships of the parties and for the acceptability of impartial decisionmaking. Those who want to make the arbitration tribunal a respected last step in the grievance procedure would do well to join
in improving the preliminary steps, because the output of the arbitrator, like that of the computer, is heavily dependent on the nature
of the input.
Despite a great deal of discussion of the subject, we do not yet
know how we should handle individual rights under the collective
agreement. Some argue that the individual should have a vested
right in the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract;
others believe that the union must be allowed to refuse to process
grievances so long as it acts in good faith; and still others think that
the individual should be permitted to force the union to take grievances involving "critical job interests" to arbitration. 25 Meanwhile,
the courts and the NLRB are troubled by the same problem. Perhaps
it is best that the problem be left to the courts or to the NLRB, but
until a clear resolution of the issue is made, it will remain a prickly
thorn for arbitrators and for the parties to the collective agreement.
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court in recent years,
mostly in connection with section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, have
greatly expanded the sphere of influence of the arbitrator. One
result of this has been that the arbitrator has been asked to play a
more active role with respect to contract enforcement than in the
past. Specifically, damages and the injunction, which were once
25. See generally Aaron, The Individual's Legal Rights as an Employee, 86 U.S.
REv. 666 (1963); Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests:
Union-Management Activity Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 631
(1959); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956).
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practically solely in the province of the courts, now frequently appear before the private arbitrator. Their very presence may inject
a new note of contention into the arena. The parties have it within
their power to define the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, and, for that
reason alone, some thoughtful consideration should be given to how
much and what kinds of power they want the arbitrator to have.
Furthermore, recent decisions of the NLRB and the courts have
resulted in new and unexplored areas of overlap or interaction between those tribunals and the arbitration process. A good example
is the Supreme Court's decision in the Westinghouse case,26 which
cleared the way for arbitrators to resolve grievances between a company and one union even though such resolution might have an
impact upon a second union not a party to the proceeding. Some
interesting experimentation with "trilateralism" has resulted, but
the question of how arbitrators' decisions and orders of the NLRB
are to be made compatible remains. This example could be repeated
in other areas, and it suggests that there should be a continuing
examination of the inter-relationship of the various tribunals.
It may also be time to re-evaluate the role played by partisan
members of the arbitration board. At the moment, the pattern ranges
from total disregard of the contractual provision which calls for the
appointment of such members to nomination of the partisan members after the case has been heard. In any event, we have no tradition
of impartiality among our representative members. Perhaps this is
not important, but it is relevant to the question of what role such
members are supposed to play. As the make-up of labor courts in
Europe shows, there is a fairly widespread conviction, which is shared
in this country, that industrial tribunals will serve a more useful
function if their membership includes representatives of both labor
and management. If this is a sound conception, the anticipated advantages to be derived from partisan members should not go by
default.
In summary, the thrust of my argument is that there is nothing
sacred about our present system of grievance arbitration; that it
will remain a useful institution only insofar as it adjusts to new times
and new circumstances; that its capacity to make this adjustment will
be enhanced by the existence of a mechanism such as the arbitration
conference; and that in the long-run the reward from this approach
will be greater than from trying to shift to a labor court system taken
from another context.
26. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).

